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PART FOUR
Procedural Law
CIVIL PROCEDURE
JAMES A. BURNES*
The following summary of civil proceduret covers the more important
and interesting Florida cases in volumes 66 to 80 inclusive of the Southern
Reporter, Second Series. This summary does not include the law of evidence
or appellate procedure, both of which are treated elsewhere.
JURISDICTION
Non-Exclusiveness Where Concurrent
Where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction of both the subject
matter and the parties, it is a general rule that the tribunal first exercising
jurisdiction in the cause retains jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
The second tribunal, however, may exercise jurisdiction as well where
there is failure to raise timely objection. In State v. Hunt,' the Circuit
Court, in granting a divorce, awarded custody of the children to the mother,
retaining jurisdiction, it was contended, to make further orders relative to
statutes governing dependency and delinquency of the children. Subse-
quently, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, under its jurisdiction
of "dependent children," ordered the children, as wards of the state, placed
with certain guardians. Without deciding the question of concurrency
or exclusiveness of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found no error in the
latter order because of the absence of timely objection before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court to the exercise of its jurisdiction. 2
*Profcssor of Law, University of Nliami School of Law.
tExtremely significant, but not within the scope of this summary, were the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which were adopted on March 1, 1954. See Arnow
and Brown, Florida's 1954 Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FLA. L. REv. 125 (1954) and
Laws of Fla. c. 29737 (1955), which integrated the Florida Statutes with the new
Rules by repealing sections completely superseded or obsolete and amending sections
requiring change in language or content; about 180 sections of the Florida Statutes were
affected thereby.
1. 70 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1954).
2. Cf. Martinez v. Martinez, 15 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1943), where the court
indicated that in an intra-Florida situation, as that above (unlike an interstate problem
where comity is involved), the second tribunal lacks itrisdiction from the commencement
of the action.
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Ternination-Action Dismissed-Lack of Prosecution
Where a pending action is dismissed for want of prosecution for one
year or more and a petition to reinstate the action is not made within
one month after the order of dismissal, the court's jurisdiction of the
cause terminates. Hence, where the one-month period had expired, the
chancellor allowed a motion to quash and vacate the order of dismissal
and to strike the motion to dismiss; this was error, the chancellor lacking
power to permit reinstatement.3
Subject Matter-Title of Real Estate
Under the Florida Constitution the Circuit Courts have exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases involving the titles of real estate.4 While this pro-
vision does not preclude a County Judge from determining the title of real
estate as between two adverse parties claiming as beneficiaries of an estate,
he lacks jurisdiction of such actions between the estate (or beneficiaries)
and third persons. Thus where claimants to real estate under a testamentary
trust sought to have declared a resulting trust of such real estate, the
matter, it was held, was within the exclusive domain of the Circuit Courts.-,
Person-Service Upon Minors
To effect proper service of process upon an infant-defendant, not
only must the summons or a copy thereof either be read or delivered to
the infant and his guardian (or such persons who have custody of him),
but it is also necessary to serve the writ upon the guardian ad litem
who is thereafter appointed by the court.0 These statutory requirements
must be met strictly. Where service was made upon a minor by serving
a writ of summons and a copy of the complaint upon the minor's mother,
as guardian, such service was held to be insufficient. 7
Person-Consent In Advance
A party may submit himself by contract to the jurisdiction of a court
in all actions arising from the contract. Where, however, an agent acting
without authority purports to bind his principal to such a contract, on
a simple principle of agency the court lacks jurisdiction of the principal.
In State v. Maxie" the defendant, a bond company, was allegedly surety
on an appearance bond in which the company waived notice and submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. The company's agent acted beyond the
scope of his authority in putting up the bond. Therefore, although the
statutory time for attacking a forfeiture judgment on the bond had expired,
3. Bowyer v. Cannon, 68 So.Zd 564 (Fla. 1953).
4. FLA. CONST., Art. V, § 17.
5. Zinnser v. Gregory, 77 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1955).
6. FLA. STAT. § 47.23 (1953).
7. Gissen v,. Goodwill, 74 So.2d 86 (17a. 1954).
8. 66 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1953); State v. Powell, 66 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1953) was
a sister case.
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the judgment was subject to direct attack, the jurisdictional basis for
such judgment against the company being absent.
Person-Constructive-Nonresidents In "Business Venture"
In a very significant decision (the constitutional implications of which
are discussed elsewhere9) an attack upon the constitutionality of the 1931
statutory amendments dealing with service of process upon nonresidents by
substituted service upon the Secretary of State 0 failed. In State v. Register,"'
the court held that when a nonresident individual purchased an orange
grove in the state and listed it for sale, lie engaged in a "business venture"
within contemplation of the statute and thereby appointed the Secretary
of State as his agent to accept service of process in any action "arising out
of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to such
'business venture.' "
Person-Constntctive-Foreign Corporation "Doing Business"
Under the same statute, which also permits service upon a business
agent of a foreign corporation carrying on business in Florida, the court
in another important decision bypassed the question of "doing business"
and held that the relationship between the corporation and its alleged
"business agent" was such that notice served upon the latter could not
be deemed fairly to be notice to the corporation. ' ' The foreign corporation
had engaged a commission salesman, the alleged "business agent," to
solicit orders. His compensation was the down payment which be collected
from the customer and retained. Orders were subject to the corporation's
acceptance, and merchandise was sent to the customers C.O.D. Additional
facts, strongly influencing the court, were: the salesman was regularly
employed by another employer; he was a stranger to the defendant, who
hired him by correspondence; and lie had solicited very few orders for the
defendant.'8
Person-Consttctive-"Reasonable Diligence"
Reiterating its earlier pronouncement as to what constitutes "reason-
able diligence" under the constructive service statute, the court stated that
the test is met if one
reasonably employed knowledge at his command, made diligent
inquiry, and exerted an honest and conscientious effort appropriate
to the circumstances, to acquire the information necessary to enable
him to effect personal service on the defendant.14
9. See "Florida Constitutional Law," p. 143, supra.
10. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1953).
11. 67 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
12. Mason v. Mason Products Co., 67 So.Zd 762 (Fla. 1953).
13. Cf. George A. Hormel & Co. v. Ackman, 158 So. 171 (Fla. 1934), which
the court cites and distinguishes on the basis that the trial court found the person to
lie the corporation's "business agent", whereas in the present case it did not.
14. Grammer v. Grammer, 80 So.d 457 (Fla. 1955); FL4. STAT. §§ 48.04 and
48.05 (1953) require search and inquiry to discover, inter alia, the name and address
of the defendants.
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VENUE
Privilege-State Agency as Defendant
A few cases involving the privilege of venue of state administrative
agencies came before the court, which repeated its established rule that
such an agency has a privilege of being sued at its governmental seat unless
the plaintiff charges that the defendant has challenged the plaintiff's
constitutional rights or has attempted to seize his property.' "  It is stated
further-and it may be regarded now as a corollary-that where the primary
purpose of a suit is to secure a judicial interpretation of an agency's rule
or for a declaration of the plaintiff's rights thereunder, the agency, as a
party defendant, may claim a privilege of being sued at its official residence.'0
In the absence of a specific legislative designation of an agency's official
residence, its actual headquarters is deemed to be its official residence.'
7
Claiming Privilege-Manner and Time
Several recent cases illustrate the practical importance of claiming
privilege of venue properly and timely. As under the former plea of
privilege of venue, a defendant, whether claiming the privilege by way
of motion to dismiss or answer, has the burden of pleading and proving
the absence of all facts which would support the propriety of the venue
as laid; in addition he must plead his privilege at an early stage of the
proceedings. Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. McDaniel'8 demon-
strates the errors into which a careless defendant may fall easily. Two
Florida corporations, X and Y, were sued jointly in Hillsborough County
on a cause of action for personal injuries presumably accruing elsewhere.
X and Y were joined as defendants upon the basis of an agency relationship
between them, such being alleged in the complaint. Y maintained a
business office in Hillsborough County; X did not. X filed a motion to
dismiss, stating that the complaint "on its face" showed a misjoinder of
parties-defendant and that venue was improper, the correct place for an
action against X being Citrus County (where X had its principal place
of business). The lower court properly denied the motion for two reasons:
1) "on its face" the complaint alleged a sound basis for joinder, and it
is settled that no privilege of venue may be claimed where an action is
brought against several properly joined corporations, where one of them
has a branch office in the county of the forum;' 9 2) the defendant, while
15. Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. State, 75 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1954); Dowey
v. Lawton, 72 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1954); McCarty v. Lichtenberg, 67 So.2d 655
(Fla. 1953).
16. Larson v. Cooper, 75 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1954). It may be explained that the
cause accrued" where the rule was issued, i.e., at the agency's official headquarters.
17. Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. State, 75 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1954); McCarty
v. Lichtenberg, 67 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1953).
18. 78 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1955).
19. F A. STAT., §§ 46.02, 46.04 (1953). The extent to which joinder may he
attacked in contesting venue has been settled fully; see L. B. McLeod Const. Co. v..
State, 143 So. 594 (Fla. 1932). In the Inverness case the question was not raised
properly.
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admitting the plaintiff's averment that it had its principal place of business
in Citrus County, did not negative the possibility that it had a branch
office in Hillsborough County, and if such a branch office were maintained,
under the venue statute X had no privilege against being sued there.2
0
Subsequently, the defendant corporation filed a second motion to dismiss,
again raising the questions of misjoinder and venue, and properly negativing
that X carried on business in Hillsborough County. The motion was denied
because the claim of privilege was made too late.21
JUDGE
Disqualification for Prejudice
A party seeking to disqualify a presiding judge for prejudice must file
pursuant to statute an affidavit stating "the facts and the reasons for the
belief" that prejudice exists; the affidavit must "be supported in substance
by affidavit of at least two reputable citizens .... '.22 Disqualifying a
judge for prejudice has not been easy of accomplishment. And as the
Supreme Court has construed the applicable statute in Hahn v. Frederick23
it appears even more difficult. The applicant's affidavit was supported by
the affidavit of two reputable citizens who swore that "the matters
therein contained are true to the best of his knowledge and belief and
he . . . believes . . . [the judge] is prejudiced .... ." The court said that
to support the facts in substance, as the statute requires, is to have
knowledge of the facts and know them to be true; the supporting affidavits
were therefore inadequate. In a dissenting opinion Justice Terrell disagreed
sharply with the majority whom he believed require by their construction
too much and thereby defeat the manifest statutory purpose.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
"Justiciable Controversy" Nonextant
Coming to the court were a number of cases involving the presence
of a "justiciable controversy"-a jurisdictional requisite to declaratory relief.
20. In Kreuger v. Coral Cables Supply Company, 78 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1955),
where the defendant presumably pleaded and proved that it neither did business nor
had an office in the county of the forum, and testimony before the trial court was
not produced for review, the allowance of a motion to dismiss was affirmed.
21. C.L.R. (1950), r. 13 (h); now FLA. R.C.P. (1954), r. 1, 11 (h),
Defendant's motion to dismiss failed for the same reason in City of Kissimmee
v. Patterson, 67 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1953). The action was brought, however, where
the cause of action accrued, and an affidavit of good faith was filed (FLA. STAT. §
46.01 (1953); it therefore appears that the defendant did not possess an exercisable
privilege. This question was not raised.
Quaere: Instead of a second motion to dismiss, if the defendant had sought to
amend his original motion, would the amendment have been allowed? Certainly it
would have been within the trial court's sound discretion to have permitted it.
It appears, unfortunately, that asserting a privilege of venue is still foundering
on the technicality which sought in yesteryear to discourage pleas in abatement.
Unquestionably our procedure should be altered to allow a simpler exercise of the
privilege. That venue is the subject for a number of appeals appears to border on
absurdity.
22. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1953).
23. 66 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1953).
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The court, therefore, had occasion to restate the several necessary elements
in every justiciable controversy: I) a bona fide present practical need for
a declaration; 2) a present ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or
present controversy as to a state of facts; 3) a person or persons who have,
or who reasonably may have, an actual, present, adverse and antagonistic
interest in the subjcct matter; 4) a seeking of relief which is not merely
legal advice nor an answcr to satisfy curiosity. 2? The number of cases
failing to contain these elements is surprising and indicates a serious mis-
understanding on the part of the bar of the scope of the remedy for a
declaratory judgment.
In Bryant v. Gray2-' a petitioner sought a declaration of his right or
eligibility under the Florida Constitution to be reelected governor in 1956
if he were elected governor to fill the unexpired term of the recently
deceased chief executive; the petitioner neither alleged that he was presently
a candidate for governor nor that he would be a candidate for that office
in 1956. Finding the facts to be hypothetical, the proceeding not to be
adversary, and the purpose of the suit to be merely for legal advice, the
court accordingly determined that no justiciable controversy was present.
In another case, where several cities requested a declaration as to the
applicability to federal highways within city limits of city ordinances
regulating the speed of vehicles, the court refused relief on the basis that
no actual controversy was present and merely an advisory opinion was
sought 20  For the same reasons and also because of the absence of an
adverse party a decree was denied where several law enforcement officers
who were also attorneys sought a declaration that a statute prohibiting
them from practicing law was unconstitutional.27  Also, a petition by a
clerk of court seeking the construction of a law setting pecuniary allowances
to jurors for transportation was deemed to be a suit merely for legal
advice; there was no genuine party-defendant.28  Relief was denied in
Brautigam v. MacVicar2 where the Dade County Port Authority, which
had contracted with Miami for the construction of a seaport, applied for
24. May v. Holley, 59 So.2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1952).
25. 70 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1954).
26. Ervin v. City of North Miami Beach, 66 So2d 235 (Fla. 1953). It is
of no small significance, however, that the court intimated that under a similar set
of facts where in addition great public interest is involved, it might be proper to grant
declaratory relief. But see also Brautigari v. MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1954)
where the court suggested otherwise.
27. Ervin v. Taylor, 66 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1953). Since the issue of the constitu-
tionality of a statute was raised, the Attorney General was made a party pursuant
to FLA. STAT. § 87.10 (1953); but he was deemed not to be an adversary. Terrell, J.
vigorously dissented, arguing the presence of an actual controversy.
28. State v. Lewis, 72 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1954). The court pointed out that
without the comptroller as a party, the decree would not bind the state or its funds.
29. 73 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1954). At p. 866 the court said:
It was not the intent of the declaratory judgment statute to conferjurisdiction on the courts to be legal advisers for all of the political
subdivisions of the state and to approve all contemplated contracts which
such political subdivisions believe to be legal but about which there may
be some doubt.
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a declaration as to the authority of the parties to contract and for approval
of a future bond issue which under the contract was to be marketed by
the Port Authority to finance the undertaking. Since all of the parties
contended that they had authority to contract, the court found the four
above-mentioned elenents of a justiciable controversy lacking; with respect
to an approval of the future bond issue, it deemed the proceeding to be
premature. Again on the basis of prematurity the court refused a declaration
to a petitioner who requested construction of a 1953 statute&0° dealing with
the qualifications of applicants to practice pharmacy. The petitioner,
who had, it appeared, not applied for admission to practice in Florida either
by way of examination 3' or reciprocity" had not exhausted his administra-
tive remedies before seeking judicial aid.33  Upon the ground that hypo-
tlietical questions as to future events do not constitute a justiciable con-
troversy, the court held there could be no declaration as to the rights of
an adopted child of a life tenant under the terms of an existing testamentary
trust which provided that upon the termination of the trust the surviving
"children" of life tenants were to become rclnaindernien. 4  In another
case petitioners were airplane pilots who, it was alleged, were refused
reinstatement discriminatorily after a strike. While they had not elected
between their remedy under the Railway Labor Act and that at law for
breach of contract, they desired a declaration as to their status as "employees"
under the act. Relief was denied because a declaration would be merely
advisory and would serve no useful purpose.35
A declaratory judgment will not be rendered where there is an
appropriate remedy at law, for there is, therefore, no practical need for a
declaration. In a suit for a declaratory decree to establish a disputed
boundary line and to have the defendants return to the plaintiff that
part of the lot of which the defendants were possessed, the court held
ejectment to be an appropriate remedy and denied relief.30  Ejectment was
again deemed appropriate where the petitioner at a judicial sale had pur-
chased bona fide land recorded in the name of the judgment debtor but
in the possession of the defendant who claimed title under an unrecorded
deed.37
Similar to the principle that an illegal contract may not be the basis
of an action at law or a suit in equity is the rule that a declaration of
rights under such a contract does not present a justiciable controversy. So
the court held where an employer sought to have its right determined under
an illegal closed shop agreement; the court added that there could be no
30. FLA. STAT. § 465.071 (1) (1953).
31. Ibid.
32. FLA. STAT. § 465.081 (1953).
33. Morrison v. Plotkin, 77 So,2d 254 (Fla. 1955).
34. Anderson v. Dinick, 77 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1955).
35. Mountain v. National Airlines, 75 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
36. Stark . Marshall, 67 So,2d 235 (Fla. 1953).
37. Cape Sable Corporation v. McClurg, 74 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1954).
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valid doubt as to the existence of a right, privilege, power or immunity
under such a contract.88
"Justiciable Controversy" Extant
On the other hand in several cases declaratory relief was held proper.
A justiciable controversy was presented where a petitioner sought a deter-
mination of his right to function as chairman of the executive committee
of a political party, the defendant also claiming such right.1 In Riviere
v. Orlando Parking Commission where a municipality contracted to acquire
hind from the defendant to establish off-street parking facilities to be
financed by a bond issue and petitioned for a declaration of its authority,
the court, basing its opinion upon Ready v. Safeway Rock Co.,40 held that
sufficient doubts as to the equities and rights of the parties were present
to constitute a case for relief under Florida Statutes, Chapter 87.41 In
another decision, which was also based on the Ready case, a tenant whose
lease had been cancelled by agreement of the parties sought the return
of a security deposit which was to be forfeited only in the event of the
tenant's default. It was held that the case fell within Chapter 87 and
presented as well an equitable cause independent of the act.42
Following a rule set forth in a number of its previous decisions, the
court in North Shore Bank v. Town of Surfside4.3 permitted a town to sue
for a declaration of the validity of its public improvement certificates
which the defcndant had agreed to buy "upon the condition that a decree
of a court ...[adjudicate] such certificates to be legal obligations." The
town, it was held, need not proceed under Florida Statutes, Chapter 75.44
The court discussed at length the limitations of proceeding under Chapter
87 rather than Chapter 75. During the following month in Bessemer
Properties, Inc. v. City of Opa-Locka45 such limitations became real where
on a virtually similar set of facts the court denied a city declaratory relief,
forcing it to proceed under Chapter 75. Whereas in the Surfside case
the mayor of the town intervened as a "property owner, taxpayer and
citizen," in the Opa-Locka case no such party was present, and the decree
of validity bound only the city and the purchaser of the certificates. Since
the latter suit had been brought to declare the "certificates to be legal
obligations of the city," a decree was of little more use than an advisory
opinion. Further, since both parties obtained in the Circuit Court the
38. Local No. 234, v. Itenley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1953).
39. Shelly v. Brewer, 68 So.2d 573 (Fla 1953).
40. 24 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1946). (This was a very early case under the Florida act,
which stressed the act's purposes).
41. 74 So.d 694 (Fla. 1954). Cf. Brautigami v. MacVicar, supra, where the
parties made no pretense at being adverse or having a bona fide dispute, but on the
contrary each had prayed for the same declaration and agreed to seek a court adjudication
of its contractual authority before marketing the bonds.
42. Hiyman v. Cohen, 73 So.Zd 393 (Fa. 1954).
43. 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
44. "Validation of Bonds: Procedure."
45. 74 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1954).
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relief they sought, there was no basis for an appeal to the Supreme Court;
if the city had proceeded under Chapter 75, an appeal could have been
prosecuted.
PARTIES
Joinder
Drawing an analogy from the law relating to guardians and wards,
the court held that the nonjoinder of a curator as a party to a suit instituted
by his ward is not a jurisdictional defect; and where the ward recovers
a judgment and no prejudice results from the nonjoinder, the judgment
will not be disturbed on review.46
Substitution
Generally substitution of a party-plaintiff should be allowed where
prcjudice to the defendant will not result. In Griffin v. XVorkinanj an
action under the wrongful death statute, the plaintiff, the deceased's
father, sued "as administrator" before he was qualified to act as such.
Upon a motion to dismiss for want of plaintiff's capacity, the deceased's
sister, who had qualified as administratrix in the meantime, moved for
her substitution as party-plaintiff. The motion was denied, and the
motion to dismiss was sustained. In reversing the trial court as to both
motions the Supreme Court stated that allowing the substitution would
not deny the defendant a substantial right; no fraud or inequity was present;
no new claim was asserted; and the period of limitations on the remedy
had not passed.
Indispensable and Necessary
Where a person obtains by alleged fraud a material interest in property
which another seeks to affect by a suit in equity, the former is an in-
dispensable party to the suit. Martinez v. Balbin48 was a suit in which
the plaintiff, a judgment creditor, sued an insolvent judgment debtor,
who was the executor and a legatee of an estate. The purpose of the
suit was to impress with a trust the defendant's share of the estate, the
defendant having allegedly transferred it to others after judgment in fraud
of the plaintiff. The court reasoned that since the transferees were charged
with participation in the fraud and have a beneficial interest in the property
transferred, they are indispensable parties. Since they had not been joined
as defendants, the chancellor properly dismissed the suit.
In suits concerning the title of real property brought against an estate
for the recovery of the property, devisees of the property are indispensable
and ncessary parties.49  Hence, where a person sued to set aside deeds
allegedly procured through fraud and the deceased transferee's estate was
46. Marquette v. Hathaway, 76 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1954).
47. 73 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1954).
48. 76 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1954).
49. FLA. STAT. § 733.02 (1953).
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a party-dcfcndant, thc court rcvCrscd :a tidgclicnt for the plaintiff for failure
to join the devisces of the real property as parties to the suit.-,
Class Suit
In a class suit the parties representing the class must be fairly repre-
scntativc of the group. In a suit against a church society of 900 members
where three of its governing officers who wcrc active in its administrative
affairs were named as the sole parties-defendant, the defendants were held
to be truly representative-particularly in view of a special master's finding
that the defendants " 'did fairly, fully, honestly and diligently defend in
behalf of the whole membership of the church.'"!
Disqualification of Corporation to Maintain or Defend
By statute corporations may not maintain or defend actions where
they arc delinquent in filing their annual reports with the Secretary of
State or paying their annual capital stock taxes; the statute does not
preclude the institution of actions for delinquencyP2  The disqualification
is removed when the delinquency has been cured, the case lying dormant
in the meantime unless a motion to dismiss has been sustained. In 1825
Collins Ave. Corp. v. Rudniek,5 3 the plaintiff corporation was delinquent
in filing its report and paying its taxes, and the defendant filed an answer
and motion for summary judgment setting up such delinquency. Before
the motion was heard, the plaintiff's delinquency was cured, and the lower
court properly did not dismiss the action."1
PLEADING
Many recent cases serve as reminders that compliance with the rules
of pleading is still of great practical importance. While inartistically
drawn pleadings are seldom fatal to the result of a case, they frequently
cause considerable inconvenience and embarrassment. The court recently
in connenting on prolixity advised:
Liberal though they are . . . the new rules both at law and in
equity forbid prolixity in pleading, and counsel will find that time
spent setting out a case briefly and in readily comprehensible
form will pay dividends at cvery stage of the litigation and will
case and accelerate the judicial process. It should be remembered
that not only opposing counsel but the trial court of its own
motion may take the initiative in striking irrelevant matter.5
50. Marquette v. Hathaway, 76 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1954).
51. Ross v. Gerung, 69 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1954).
52. FLA. STAT. § 610.11 (1949), repealed by Laws of Fla. c. 28170, § 2 (1953) and
succeeded by FLA. STAT. § 608.35 (1953).
53. 67 So.2d 424 (Fia. 1953).
54. Oddly enough, on appeal it was the plaintiff who insisted on dismissal,
for judgment had been entered against it on the motion for summary judgment.
3. lintel & Rcestaurant Employees v. Boca Raton Club, 73 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1954).
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Ultimate Facts and Conclusions of Law
Requiring the pleading of ultimate facts as distinguished from con-
clusions of law is simple in theory but difficult, at timcs, in application.
In a suit to foreclose a mortgage on land, the defendants counterclaimed,
alleging by ultimate facts a lease between the plaintiffs and the defendants
whereby the latter wcrc to operate a golf rangc on the land for their
gain with a portion of the profits therefrom to be paid to the plaintiffs
as rent. The defcndants next proceeded to allege baldly that a partnership
existed between all of the parties and prayed for an accounting. The
court quite propcrly characterized the allegation of partnership as a conclu-
sion of law, and reasoned that since the ultimate facts pleaded did not
support such conclusion, the defendant had not stated a cause for relief;
"in a suit in equity between partners concerning their interstitial rights
and liabilities the pleading should allege the names of the partners, the
term of the partnership and the rights and interest of the partners."30" In
another case, a suit for the declaration of a resulting trust of property
where the funds used for its purchase were allegedly the plaintiff's, itwas
held that an averment that the plaintiff "never made any gift of said ...
property to" the transferee constituted ultimate facts and sufficed to
state the plaintiff's intention not to make a gift of the property T Again
the problem was raised in Anderson v. Murwell Motor Co. 58 in determining
whether the requisite jurisdictional amount for bringing an action in the
Circuit Court was present. The plaintiff's complaint sought recovery for
the conversion of his automobile, which lie alleged to be worth less than
the jurisdictional minimum. Allegations in the complaint that the de-
fendants "wilfully, wantonly and maliciously converting the said automobile"
were deemed to be mere conclusions of law, and hence in effect the
plaintiff had failed to claim punitive damages, without which the juris-
dictional requirement was patently lacking.
Foreign Law
A related question involves recognition of foreign law. Under former
Florida procedure foreign law was regarded as fact, not law, and therefore
it was necessary that it be pleaded and proved. The Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act, which Florida adopted in 1949, permits the
court to regard foreign law as law and to take judicial notice of it. In
a recent case, Kingston v. Quimby," the court pointed out that the act
does not operate automatically, so that where a party intends to rely upon
foreign law, he must give notice of his intention to his adversary by pleading
or otherwise. 60
56. Phelps v. Gilbreth, 68 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1953).
57. Medary %. Dalman, 69 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1954).
58. 73 So.2d 822 (F1a. 1954).
59. 80 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955).
60. FL. STAT. § 92.031 (4) (1953) specifically provides for it.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Factual and Certain
Pleaders, in stating grounds upon which relief call be granted or in
stating a defense, should be mindful always of the requirements that
pleadings be factual and certain and that sufficient material facts be alleged.
In a suit to enjoin a public nuisance, viz., a house of ill-repute, the aver-
menat that it was plaintiff's "firm conviction" that such a house was being
operated was decmed insufficicnt. In another count of the same bill the
plaintiff alleged thc purpose for which the house was set up, but did not
aver that the pturpose was fulfilled, thus failing to allege that a house
of prostitution was being operated and thereby not stating a cause of
action. 'l'le court quoted approvingly:
[Generally the purpose of suing] to enjoin a nuisance should be
clearly indicated and facts alleged showing the existence of the
alleged nuisance and the character and extent of the danger or
damage occasioned thereby.
The court said that while maintenance of a house of prostitution is a
public nuisance per se and the "character and extent of the danger or
damage" need not be alleged, nevertheless it is necessary to aver "the
existence of the alleged nuisance." 6'
Defamation Per Se-Extrinsic Facts
Words that are not defamatory on their face but require extrinsic
facts and circumstances to show their defamatory nature may nevertheless
be defamatory per se;02 if there was any doubt of this, it has been removed
expressly by the court. In Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club,63 an
action for slander, the plaintiff charged the defendant with calling him a
"stoop." The defendant claimed that the alleged defamatory words were
not slanderous per se, and since the plaintiff had not alleged special
damages in his complaint, he had failed to state a cause of action. Although
"stoop" is not a defamatory word on its face, the court looked to the
complaint to ascertain its alleged meaning and determine whether an
action for slander per se had been stated. "Stoop" was alleged to mean "a
person who picks up race tickets off the ground and attempts to cash them
in as his own purchased ticket." Held: defendant's contentions were
correct.
64
61. Ellis v. State, 73 So.2d 85 (Ila. 1954). ['he noisancelL-h cause of
action-for which the comty solicitor may suc is defined by FLA. STAT. § 823.05 (1953).
62 To recover for slander per se no special damage need be alleged or proved,
whereas the contrary is true of slander per quod. Words are slanderous per se if they
impute to another "(a) a criminal offense amounting to a felony, or (b) a presently
existing venereal or other loathsome and communicable disease, or (c) conduct,
characteristics, or a condition incompatible with the proper exercise of his lawful business,
trade, profession, or office, or (d) the other being a woman, acts of unehastity."
Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1953).
63. 66 So.2d 495 ([la. 1953).
64. The principal case shows the need for the modern pleader in pleading an
action for defamation to know the functions of the inducement, colloquium and
innuendo.
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Decree on Bill and Answer-Expiration of Time for Testimony
'With a few exceptions a cause is at issue ten days (under the former
equity rules) 6 after filing the answer.06  Unless the court orders or the
parties stipulate otherwise, a period of two months is allowed for taking
testimony after a cause is at issue.6 7  In Muller v. Maxcy 8 an interesting
situation arose. The plaintiff sued to cancel a tax deed, and the de-
fendant 0 answered by denying all material allegations in the complaint
and also by challenging its legal adequacy. More than two months and
ten days thereafter the defendant set the cause down to be heard on the
pleadings. At the hearing the plaintiff moved to extend the tine for
taking testimony; the motion was denied, and a decree on the pleadings
was entered for the defendant. Held: this was not error. The motion
to extend the time for taking testimony was not timely, since more than
two months had passed after reaching issue; the defendant was entitled
to a "ruling of the merits."70  Since the material allegations of the bill,
of which the plaintiff had the burden of proof, were denied, and since
the plaintiff had not sought nor obtained a ruling by the chancellor
on the defendant's defense in law, a decree on bill and answer was entered
properly for the defendant.
DEFENSES
Res Judicata-denticalness
Several cases indicate that the conditions necessary to the application
of the doctrine of res judicata are much misunderstood or ignored. The
court restated, as it has many times before, four requisites of this defense:
(1) identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action;
(3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the
quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made." Donahue
v. Davis7 2 illustrates the necessity that the things sued for and the causes
of action be identical. Two of the four shareholders of a corporation
sued the other two for fraud involved in purchasing land for the corporation.
A prior suit by one of the two defendants against the other three share-
holders charging conversion of stock certificates and praying for equitable
relief was not a bar to the present suit. In another obvious case, A, a
65. E.R. 1950, r. 39; now 20 days, I"LA. R.C.P., r. 3.8.
66. Where there are multiple parties-defendant, the suit is not at issue as to all
plaintiffs who have not filed answers merely because others have done so. Rountree
v. Rountree, 72 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1954).
67. E.R., r. 46; now FLA. R.C.P. r. 3.13.
68. 74 So.2d 879 (Fia. 1954).
69. Actually there were two defendants but to explain the ease with respect
to both is to no advantage.
70. It appears from the court's language that such a decree is res judicata, Also.
the decree stated that defendant's "denials are to be taken as true in the absence
of proof to the contrary."
71. Donahuc v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163, 169 (Fla. 1953). Even the Supreme
Court admitted it confused the doctrine of res iudicata with the principle of collateral
estoppel. See Universal Const. Co. v. Fort Lauderdale. 68 So,2d 366, 369 (Fla. 1953).
72. Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1953).
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railroad company, sued B, an clectric comipa y. to rccover indemnity
for payment of a judgment obtained in a federal court against A by C,
A's employee. C had been injured when a flat car ran into a wire which
had been strung across A's tracks by B with A's permission; C's recovery
was based upon failure to provide a safe place to work. The court brushed
aside B's defense of res judicata as inadequate in law upon the ground
that the causes of action in the two actions were different.73
Res Judicata-Matter Not Litigated
Res judicata is a defense to all matters which were or should have
been litigated in the prior action. Accordingly, a final decree in a suit
for divorce settles all the property rights of the parties and bars any suit
brought thereafter to determine such matters.7 4  Res judicata, therefore,
was a defense in a suit by a woman against her divorced husband where
she sought to set aside a property settlement made in contemplation of
divorce upon the grounds that the settlement was unfair and was made
under duress; the fact that such matters were not litigated in the suit
for divorce was of no moment.7 5 Also, where, on the basis of her divorced
spouse's alleged fraud in not making a full disclosure of his assets, a
former wife sought to set aside a property settlement incorporated in the
divorce decree, res judicata was a good defense.76
Res Judicata-Merits
Res judicata is not a bar to a cause of action formerly adjudicated
upon other than its merits. Hence, where a suit in equity was dismissed
because of "unclean hands," the plaintiff was not barred from suing at
law, the dismissal being merely an expression that the court was unwilling
to aid the plaintiff.'7
Res Judicata-Distinguished
Two interesting cases arose which illustrate nice distinctions between
res judicata, estoppel of a different nature, and stare decisis. In Kautzmann
v. james38 the plaintiff sought damages for a peptic ulcer caused from
his consumption of improper medicine negligently mislabelled by the
defendant, a druggist. Previously the plaintiff had sued the defendant
for such negligence, but the complaint was insufficient in law, for its
averments assigned as the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury the
73. Suwanec Valley E. Co-op. v. Live Oak Perry & G.R. Co., 73 So.2d 820
(Fla. 1954). In addition the parties were different. B wanted to establish thereby
that A was contributorily or concurringly negligent or in pari delicto with B. Since
the parties were not identical or in privity, even the principle of collateral estoppel
was inapplicable.
74. It is assumed, of course, that the court has jurisdiction in personam of the
parties.
75. Cooper v. Cooper, 69 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1954).
76. Cohen v. Cohen, 70 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1954).
77. lauer v. Thum, 67 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1953).
78. 66 So.Zd 66 (Fla. 1953).
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defendant's disclosure to the plaintiff that the bottles had been mislabelled,
an act which was not alleged to be negligent; upon an order of dismissal
with leave to amend, the plaintiff chose to stand on his complaint, and
from an adverse final judgment subsequently lost an appeal to the Supreme
Court. The complaint in the present action stated a good cause for
relief, the plaintiff purposely eschewing any reference to the defendant's
disclosure of mislabelling and assigning the negligent mislabelling as the
proximate cause of injury. The trial court, upon the defendant pleading
res judicata, rendered a summary judgment against the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment basing its rationale not upon "'the
cstoppel arising from the judgment as res judicata but rather that arising
where a party litigant attempts to assume inconsistent and contradictory
positions with respect to the same matter.' "7 In another case, Drawdy
Investment Company v. Leonard,80 the plaintiff sued to quiet title. For-
merl lie had sued the same defendant in ejectment where, after filing at
least five successive bills of particulars in an attempt to state a cause of
action, his action was dismissed for failure to state a ground upon which
relief could be granted. He did not avail himself of leave to amend
which had been given in the order of dismissal. The substance of the bill
in the present suit was not at variance with the bill of particulars in the
former action. In affirming the judgment dismissing the present suit,
the court held that it was unnecessary to discuss the doctrine of res
judicata since the simple rule of stare decisis applied.8'
Res ,udicata-invocation Withheld
While the policy of res judicata is to bring litigation to a timely
end, under exceptional circumstances the doctrine may be withheld so as
not to defeat justice. In Universal Construction Co. v. City of Fort Lauder-
dale,812 the question arose whether the defendant-city could raise the de-
fense of res judicata in an action in quantum mernit for "additional im-
provements" which the plaintiff-company bad made incident to but not
within the terms of its contract to construct a special fund project for
the city. In a former suit which the city had instituted against the
company for a declaratory decree and other relief and in which the
company sought by counterclaim to recover on the express contract for
the improvements, the court determined that the company was obligated
79. Quaere: Does this type of case differ from inserting contradictory facts by
arn-ndment in the first action? The complaint had not been verified.
The court could have based its decision upon plaintiff's failure to amend his
complaint in the first action, having been given the opportunity to do so. See, e.g.,
Elfnan v. Glaser, 313 Mass. 370, 47 N.E.2d 925 (1943). If the plaintiff's second
action had charged the defendant with negligently making the disclosure, it appears
from the court's opinion that he would not have been prevented from doing so. It is
submitted that the suggestion as to failure to amend is a better rule.
80. 77 So.2d 855 (Vla. 1955).
81. Hlere again the court could have based its decision upon plaintiff's failure
to amend his complaint in the first action.
82. 68 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1953).
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to construct "additional buildings" under the contract, and that although
during the construction of such buildings the plaintiff constructed "addi-
tional improvementc'" which were approved and accepted by resolution of
the city as performance of the obligation to build "additional buildings,"
the agreement and acceptance were ultra vires; therefore, a decree for damages
was entered against the company for failure to construct "additional build-
ings." It was also held that the company's counterclaim on the express
contract failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court stated that the
cause of action on quantum meruit in the present action was identical
with the cause of action in the former suit, and that although the doctrine
of res judicata would prevent the company from raising any issue which
might have been presented in the former action, the court would not
permit that defense to be invoked since the parties had acted in good
faith and unjust enrichment would otherwise result,
Collateral Estoppel
The court defined again the principle of collateral estoppel:
. ..where a later suit between the same parties as were involved
in a prior litigation is upon a different claim or demand . . thejudgment in the prior action will not operate as an estoppel except
as to those matters "actually litigated and determined in the initial
action", (case cited), or those "rights or questions * e ncessarily
involved in the conclusions reached". (cases cited) 8
Illustrative of this principle was a quo warranto proceeding to annul the
charter of a corporation wherein a woman, named as a party thereto,
filed a cross-bill against her divorced husband and the corporation con-
testing the validity of the property settlement determined in the divorce
suit. Since the property settlement involved assets of the corporation,
the woman by attacking its validity sought to have her rights in such
assets adjudicated. The court held that she was estopped by the decree
to raise the question.84 Also, in Donahue v. Davis,"' supra, stockholders
sued other stockholders for fraud incident to the purchase of an asset
for the corporation; it was held that although the fraud was disclosed
in a prior action between the same parties for conversion of stock certificates,
it did not bar the present suit, since the fraud was not necessarily involved
in the conclusions reached in the previous action nor was it in fact a
litigated issue. In the interesting case of Avant v. Hammond Jones, Inc.,"8
the court decided that A, a plaintiff-vendee, was estopped to maintain an
action against B, a vendor, for the conversion of spreaders welded by A
to trucks which had been sold to A by B on a conditional sale contract
and which had been replevied by B. The court reasoned that in the replevin
83. Donahue v. Davis, 68 So,2d 163 (iFla. 1953).
84. Reed v. Reed, 70 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1954).
85. 68 So.2d 163 (Fia. 1953).
86. 79 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1955).
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action, in which B prevailed by default, the rights to possession of the
spreaders as well as the trucks were adjudicated. 7
Statute of Limitations-Applicability
A few cases set at rest the applicability of several enactments limiting
actions. In a case of first impression the court, swayed by the great
weight of American authority, held that the two-year statute of limitations
which is expressly applicable to "an action for libel [and] slander"' ,
embraces too an action for slander of title."" And the same two-year
statute, which also governs "an action by another than the state upon
a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, " was held to constitute a defense to
a suit to cancel a mortgage and a note on grounds of usuaryy' In another
case the court decided that actions arising under the Bastardy Acts of
1828 and 1951 are governed by the three-year statute, since such actions
fail within the definition of "an action upon a liability created by statute,
other than a penalty or forfeiture"; "2 in such cases under the acts a court
of equity will give the statute substantially the same effect as it would
receive in a court of law. '5
Statute of Limitations-Accrual of Cause of Action
The court answered some difficult questions relative to when a cause
of action accrues for purposes of ascertaining expiration of the period of
limitation. It was held that the right of recovery on a husband's express
contractual obligation to pay weekly instahnents to his former wife fol
the support of their minor child accrued against each payment as it
fell dueY4  In another case the court decided that a right of action for
slander of title is not a continuing one but accrues at the time the tortious
act occurs, e.g., wrongfully and maliciously filing a notice of lienY5  Draw-
ing a nice distinction between notice of a negligent act and notice of its
consequences, the court in City of Miami v. Brooks 0 held that a cause
87. . . .or should have been adjudicated. The decision could have been based
upon failure to file a compulsory counterclaim in the replevin action. FLA. STAr. § 52.11(1) (1953).
88, FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (6) (1953).89. Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Industries, 68 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1953). Other-
wise the four-year period applicable to actions for relief not specifically provided for
in Chapter 95 would have governed. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1953).
90, It is commonly employed as a defense to an action to recover on a promissory
note exacting usurious interest under FLA. STAT. §§ 687.03, 687.04.
91. Young v. Wilder, 77 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1955),
92. FLA. STAT. § 95.1l(5)(a) (1953).
93. Wall v. Johnson, 78 So.2d 371 (bla. 1955). In the absence of compelling
considerations, a court of equity will give the statute of limitations the same effect as will a
court of law; this well settled rule was reiterated in Hl. K. L. Realty Corp. v. Kirtley,
74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954).
94. Isaacs v. Deutseh, 80 So.2d (Fla. 1955). Justice Terrell, writing a dissenting
opinion, urged that the husband's obligation "to furnish labor and rations," as he
put it, was a continuing one and therefore accrued upon the maturity of the obligation, i.e.,
when the minor child reached majority.
95. Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Industries, 68 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1953).96. 70 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
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of action for personal injuries arising from negligently overexposing the
plaintiff to X-rays during medical treatment accrued, not necessarily when
the overexposure took place, but when the plaintiff knew or had reason
to know of the violation of her right. And in South Hastings Drainage
District v. \Vright 17 the court decided that a cause of action for payment
of bonds payable out of a special fund, such as those of a drainage district,
docs not accrue if the particular fund has not been established. 8
Statute of Limitations-Tolling
In accordance with the general rule that there is no tolling of a statute
of limitations unless statutory provision is made therefor, it was held that
the insanity of the plaintiff will not toll the running of the statute in an
action for slander of title. 9 It was also held that where a common law
action was perpetually enjoined incident to a suit in equity, the statute
of limitations on a debt which was the subject of a counterclaim in the
common law action tolled until the debt was asserted as a counterclaim
in the suit.100
PRETRIAL MOTIONS
Motion to Dismiss-Res Judicata
Although the rules make no mention of raising res judicata as a defense
by way of motion to dismiss, in Cohen v. Cohen'01 the court held that it
was permissible to raise it by such a motion where the complaint on its
face contains the facts of the defense.
Motion for Summary Judgment-Test
A substantial number of appeals came to the court involving summary
judgments.10 2  A motion for a summary judgment or decree should be
allowed:
If the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
or decree as a matter of law. 03
97. 72 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1954).
98. Obviously, it is based on the theory that establishment of the fund is a
condition precedent to obtaining satisfaction thereon.
99. Carey v, Beyer, 75 So.2d 217 (Fl, 1954); FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6). Cf. FL.
STAT. § 92.20 (1953) which provides for tolling the statute in actions involving adverse
possession of real property during the disseisee's insanity.
100. Schwartz v. Zaconick, 74 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1954).
101, 70 So.2d 362 (Pla. 1954). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are similarly
interpreted. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTice (2d ed. 1948) par. 8. 28.
102. More than 20 appeals wholly or almost wholly involved the allowance or
disallowance of a summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment has not
only resulted in a great savings of time and expense at the trial level, but it has also
brought a net advantage to the Supreme Court, which, if the procedure for summary
judgment had not h1cen instituted, would be hearing many more appeals on motions
for a new trial, etc.
103. Fi. + R.C.P. (1954), r. 1.35(c); substantially unchanged from C.L.R. (1950),
r. 43 and E.R. (1950), r. 40.
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Hence, the test for allowing such a motion is "no genuine issue as to any
material fact," and not the absence of merely a "substantial controversy."1II
Doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must bc
resolved against granting the motion.105  The accepted practice, further-
more, is to "accord the chancellor reasonable latitude in determining
whether there is in fact a case to be tried,"'' 0
Motion for Summary Judgment-Matter Considered for Decision
A few miscellaneous questions arose as to the kind and relativc weight
of matter which the trial judge may consider in determining the absence
of a genuine issue as to material facts. Upon the retrial of a case the court
may consider material excerpts from testimony in the first trial. 07 Further,
a judge may "pierce the shield of the pleadings in search of a genuine
issue."' 08 Also, on defendant's motion for a summary judgment a verified
complaint should be accorded dignity equal to that of dcfendant's affidavits,
i.e. counter-affidavits, 'D In another case the court held that an affidavit
of "belief" of an ultimate fact is insufficient to support the truth of such
fact." Moreover, without an adequate explanation, a party contesting
a motion may not create a genuine issue of a material fact by repudiating
in his affidavit facts set out in his antecedent deposition, such deposition
104. Cannon v. Putnam County, 75 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1954).
105. Johnson v. Studstill, 71 So.2d 251 (Fla. 1954); Manning v. Clark, 71 So.2d
508 (Fla. 1954). In the former case, at p. 252, the court quoted the following
with approval:
'(1) Factual issues are not to be tried or resolved by summary judgment
procedure; only the existence of a genuine and material factual issue is
to be determined. Once it is determined that there is such an issue
summary judgment may not be granted;
(2) In making this determination doubts (of course the doubts are not
fanciful) are to be resolved against the granting of summary judgmcnt;
(3) There may be no genuine issue even though there is a formal issue.
Neither a purely formal denial nor, in every case, general allegations,
defeat summary judgment. On this point the cases decided by this court
must rest on their own facts rather than upon a rigid rule that an
assertion and a denial always preclude the granting of summary judgment.
Those cases stand for the proposition that formalism is not a substitute
for the necessity of a real or genuine issue. \Vhether the situation falls
into the category of formalism or genuineness cannot be decided in the
abstract;
(4) If conflict appears as to a material fact the summary procedure does
not apply unless the evidence on one or the other hand is too incredible
to be accepted by reasonable minds or is without legal probative force
even if true;
(5) To support summary judgment the situation must justify a directed
verdict insofar as the facts are concerned.'
106. Lewis v. Lewis, 73 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1954).
107. Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., 67 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1953).
10,9. Lewis v. Lewis, 73 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1954).
109. Booth v. Board of Public Instruction, 67 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1953).
110. Waldo v. United States Ramie Corp., 74 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1954).
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being filed by the movant in support of the motion."' And where facts
are admitted, such facts should be ultimate facts as contradistinguished
from evidentiary facts, for where several inferences of ultimate facts may
be drawn reasonably from admitted evidentiary facts, the court in granting
the motion would invade the province of the jury.112
Motion for Summary Judgment-Judgment for Movee
Following the construction given to the federal rule, the court held
that upon plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment where there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, the trial judge may grant a
summary judgment for the defendant.'' 3
Motion for Summary Judgment-Order of Hearing Several Motions
Whcrc both a motion for a summary judgment and a motion to strike
a pleading are concurrently before the trial judge, determining the ordcr
in which he hears them falls within the judgc's discretion to control his
docket.' 14
AMEN D NINTS
Liberally Allowed-Discretion
Generally amendments should be allowed "in furtherance of justice,'"
The court has followed a liberal policy towards this end; and on a number
of occasions trial judges have been reversed for improperly refusing leave
to amend.' i" In a recent case, for example, the trial court was reversed
where it refused to permit the plaintiff to amend his complaint after his
original and two amended complaints were dismissed for failure to state
a cause for relief and leave to amend was withheld. Upon additional
counsel being retained, the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint a
third time. The amendment was considered by the court and refused,
probably on the ground of inadequacy in law. Mainly because of this and
also because of a lack of dilatoriness in the case, the Supreme Court con-
cluded the trial court should have allowed the amendment and should
have subsequently passed upon its adequacy in law.1 7
It appears that where a complaint is insufficient in law, and there is
some expectation that the plaintiff actually has a cause of action, he
Ill. Ellison v, Anderson, 74 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
112. National Airlines v. Florida Equipment Co., 71 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1954). The
court implied that the facts admitted should always be ultimate facts. Yet its language
should be restricted to the case. Where but one inference can be drawn reasonably
from admitted evidentiary facts, the reason for requiring admissions of only ultimate
facts fails.
113. Carpineta v. Shields, 70 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1954).
114 .1wis _v. Lewis, 73 Sold72 (Ela 1954).
115. FLA. R.CP. (1954) r. i.15(e).
116. 'rwyman v. Livingston, 58 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1952). Carview v. Cloverleaf, Inc.,
136 Fla. 899, 187 So. 360 (1939).
117. Wilensky v. Perell, 72 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1954).
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should be given an opportunity to amend. In Slavin v. McCann Plumbing
Co.,' the plaintiff, a guest in a motel, received injuries from a wash basin
located in his room. He joined the plumbing contractor as a defendant
and charged it with negligence. Although it is a well settled rule that
such a contractor is neither liable for ordinary negligence nor comes within
the rule as to dangerous instrumentalities, the court held that in view of
the many exceptions to the rule, the plaintiff should have been given leave
to amend.
While justice may be furthered through liberality of amendment,
such liberality can promote a contrary effect where it encourages unreason-
able violation of rules of procedure or leads to dilatoriness. Pearson v.
Sindelar"O is illustrative of this point. In that case the defendant amended
his defense three times and was given leave to amend it a fourth time.
His original answer and the first amendment, being obscure and prolix,
were stricken on motion; his answer as amended a second and third time
were shams. The defendant stood on his answer as amended a third time
and went to the Supreme Court on appeal where the action of the lower
court was affirmed. "Justice delayed is justice denied."
Stage of Proceedings When Made
Amendments may be permitted during or after trial where they do
not prejudice the Qpposing party. Hence it was held proper where there
was no surprise to allow during the trial an oral motion to add special
damages (tuneral expenses) to the complaint. 20 But in Seltzer v. Brine'2'
the opposite result was reached where a similar amendment was moved and
allowed after the defendants' closing argument and before the plaintiff's
rebuttal; not having litigated the matter and having had no notice of the
claim and no opportunity to meet it at the trial or comment on it
thereafter, permitting the amendment was deemed prejudicial error. In
another case' 22 the principle of the statute of jeofailes and amendments' 3
was applied after judgment and on appeal to amend the defendant's answer.
In that case the defendant adduced evidence of a judgment of a sister
state, as an estoppel, at the final hearing without having pleaded it.' 24 To
correct harmless error and to satisfy the basic rule that allegata and probata
118. 73 So.2d 902 (VMa. 1954).
119. 75 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1954).
120. Smollin v. Wilson, 74 So.2d 685 (Ha. 1954).
121. 79 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1955).
122. Overly v. Overly, 66 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1953).
123. FLA. STAT. § 54.26 (1953). The court does not cite this statute, but instead
cites an early case based upon it.
124. The principal case held that a party may adduce evidence of estoppel at
the final hearing-after the pleadings are closed and testimony before the master is
completed-where he has no prior opportunity to plead an estoppel.
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must correspond, the court presumed the answer to be amended so as to
include the defense of estoppel.12
Changing "Cause of Action"
A plaintiff may not change his "cause of action" by amendment.
This ancient rule becomes of vital importance where a plaintiff, in order
to recover, must amend his complaint and if forced to institute a new
action would be put to a serious disadvantage, e.g., great difficulty in
obtaining service of process upon the defendant. In applying the rule,
determining what constitutes changing a cause of action becomes pertinent.
The problem arose in Lopez v. Avery, 2 where a wife brought suit against
her husband for the supersession,2n- of a Missouri decree for the future sup-
port of their minor child on the basis of changed circumstances. The hus-
band, a non-resident of Florida, was served with process in Florida, Upon
allowing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, the plaintiff was given leave to amend. Her amended
complaint was dismissed on motion on the basis that it changed her cause
of action, although as amended her complaint was essentially the same as
the original complaint as to facts alleged and relief sought save that the
amendment added a prayer for the establishment of the Missouri decree
in Florida as a local decree and for alteration of the latter decree. The
original complaint was defective, it appears, because it sought modification
of the Missouri decree directly. In reversing the trial court and rejecting
the contention that the amendment substantially and, therefore, improperly
departed from the original pleading, the court applied the test:
. . whether the matter introduced by way of amendment requires
a different character of evidence for its support than would be
required for proof of the antecedent pleading and whether proof
of additional facts will be required to sustain the late pleading1 2Bb
Also putting it another way, it said:
. . where an amended pleading asserts rights or claims arising
out of the same transaction, act, agreement or obligation in which
the original pleading is founded, and the parties in interest and
the essential elements of the controversy remain the same, the
amendment will not be regarded as a new cause of action
DISCOVERY
Interrogatories-Decision on Objections-Delay
Discovery obtained through interrogatories may obviate the need for
the entire trial or a part thereof. It is, therefore, important that such a
125. Incidentally, this decision obviated the need to decide whether a letter
from defndant's counsel presumably to plaintiff's counsel constituted an express amend-
ment to defendant's answer.
126. 66 So.2d 689.
126a. The suit was not brought to modify the Missouri decree, but to supersede
its terms.
126b. Gerstel v. William Curry's Sons Co., 20 So.Zd 802, 804 (Fla. 1945).
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valuable procedural tool be administered properly. In LiUlli Ann Corp. v.
Wi/ck 2 the plaintiff sought damages for piracy of trade-names used on
garments sold by the defendant. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's
interrogatories which sought to discover the defendant's source of supply;
the defendant claimed that to answer would reveal a trade secret. Alth6ugh
the only issue of fact in the case was whether the plaintiff manufactured
the garments sold by the defendant or whether such garments were
imitations of those manufactured by the plaintiff, the chancellor reserved
his decision until the hearing on the merits. On certiorari such reserva-
tion was held to be an abuse of discreton.
Several Claims
Although the modem tendency is to permit several claims to be
tried together in order to effect economy of time and money, where
claims are unrelated and trying them at the same time will result in great
confusion, separate trials should be ordered. In Nash v. Walker s the
plaintiff sued the defendant on an account and garnished a bank of which
defendant was a depositor; the defendant counterclaimed for damages
allegedly caused by the plaintiff's abusive employment of the writ of
garnishment. The court held error was committed where such unrelated
claims in contract and tort were tried together.
Right to t-ial by jury-Proceedings Supplementary to Execution
There is no right to trial by jury in statutory proceedings supple-
mentary to execution whereby fraudulent conveyances made by the de-
fendant may be set aside. 129 In Dezen v. Slatcoff'30 the defendant had
transferred his title to an automobile to his wife, W, the day he was
served with process. In an answer to a rule to show cause why the
transfer should not be declared fraudulent and set aside, W contested
the allegations as to the transfer and claimed trial by jury. Upon exarnina-
tion of affidavits and documentary evidence, and after a hearing, the trial
court set aside the transfer. The Supreme Court concluded that Common
Law Rule 31 ("Demand for Jury Trial-Waiver") 13' had no application
to such a proceeding, and further that no constitutional right to trial by
jury was involved. The court pointed out that after the sheriff levies
upon such property-the automobile in this case-W, pursuant to the
statute, may file a claim to the property and in that proceeding demand
a trial by jury."82
127. 79 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1955).
128. 78 So.2d 685 (Fla. 1955).
129. Such proceedings are provided for by FLA. STAT. § 55,57 (1953).
130. 66 So.2d 485 (Fla. 1953).
131. Now FLA. R.C.P. (1954) r. 2.1.
132. FLA. STAT. § 55.57 (1953) provides for filing a bond with the claim i'i tic-,
manner required in other cases where a third person claims property taken under lcvy.
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Peremptory Challenges-Partners
The court has interpreted Section 54.11 of the Florida Statutes, which
provides that in a civil cause "each party shall be entitled to three per-
emptory challenges," to mean that where partners are sued as such in
tort, the partnership in effect being the "real" party, the partners col-
lectively, not severally, are entitled to three challenges.'33
Directed Verdict-Opening Statement
Unlike the rule in several jurisdictions, in Florida a directed verdict
may not be granted upon the legal inadequacy of plaintiff's opening state-
ment, the purpose of the statement being merely to disclose the plaintiff's
theory of recovery and what lie intends to prove. Hence, where the trial
court directed a verdict for the defendant "on the ground that the facts
of the opening statement, if proved, would not be sufficient for a jury
verdict under the guest statute," the Supreme Court reversed the directionY1N
Admitting Facts-In Open Court
Where counsel admits facts and neither he nor his client understands
the legal effect of the facts admitted, the client is not 'bound by the
admission. Employing flis dubious general principle in order to effect
a just result, the Supreme Court concluded that an admission by counsel
in open court that the only issue in the case was that of damages was
not wholly binding on the client since neither counsel nor client realized
that thereby counsel was admitting the legal validity of the plaintiff's
cause of action.135
Recess-Discretion
Seldom does the court find an abuse of the trial court's discretion
in the latter's calling or failing to call a recess. In Herbert v. Garner 36
such an abuse was found. It was a personal injury action in which the
defendant requested a recess until the following morning so that a doctor
who attended the plaintiff could testify; the time was 3:30 P.M.; it was
the last day of trial; the doctor was engaged elsewhere treating a patient
requiring his attention; counsel for defendant had done all the law required
to have the doctor present.
Continuance-Discretion
In another case the trial judge was held not to have abused his
discretion where plaintiff's counsel was refused a continuance. The suit
was commenced in 1949, was at issue in January, 1952, was noticed for
trial by defendant in September, 1952, and was set for trial one month
133. Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1953).
134. Van Iloven v. Burk, 71 So2d 158 (Fla. 1954).
135. Love v. Hannah, 72 So.2d 39 (F1a. 1954). it is very doubtful that tile
ge-neral principle will be employed other than in rare instances.
136. 78 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1955).
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thereafter. The plaintiff's counsel sought a continuance because depositions
of the plaintiff, who was in Mississippi, had not been received, although
arrangements had been made with associate counsel in Mississippi to get
them. Emphasizing that until the day of trial plaintiff's counsel lacked
information as to whether the depositions had been taken and implying
thereby that assiduous effort to secure the depositions had not been made,
the court held that it was not error for the trial judge to deny a continuance
and to order dismissal."'
Conference Prior to Charge-Not Held
Although a trial judge's failure to hold a conference at the conclusion
of evidence in order to settle instructions is a violation of the rules of
court,"s it is not prejudicial error where counsel sits idly by and does
not request the court to hold such a conference. Further, a request for
such a conference after the jury has retired may be refused for tardiness. 3
Charge-Misleading
In charging the jury the judge must not assume the truth of contro-
verted facts or instruct the jury as to duties owed by the defendant which
are not supported by evidence. In Bessett v. 1lackett'4" the trial judge
instructed, "If a motorist is driving on a race track, he is excused in pulling
the throttle wide open to see just how fast he can make her go, but
that is not the rule when driving through a populous cominunity;" and
"in many rural communities it is not necessary to bring one's car down
to the speed required in passing schools and through the cities." At the
trial evidence as to the speed of the automobile was in serious conflict, and
the only evidence as to the type of community in which the locus in quo
was situated was that it was rural. The charge was prejudicial error, since
the jury might havc assumed readily that the judge had concluded that
the defendant was speeding recklessly through a populous community.
Jury Retired-Review of Evidence
Florida Power and Light Co. v. Robinson 4 , illustrates the wide
discretion reposed in the trial judge in his conduct of a trial. It was
held that it is not an abusc of discretion to deny a jury's request to have
portions of the evidence read to them during their deliberations; further,
the judge may refuse to repeat part of his charge, if it was explicit, for
repetition of a part tends towards unfair emphasis.
B37, Raincy v. Roesall Corp., 71 So.2d 160 (l la. 19;4).
138. C.LR.,(1950) r, 39 (b); now FLA. R.C.P. (1951) r. 2.6(b).
139. Luster v. Moore. 78 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1955).
140. 66 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1953).
141. 68 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1953).
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Verdict-Avoidance by juror's Affidavit
A verdict may be avoided after rendition by affidavits of jurors dis-
closing improprieties occurring during the trial or in the jury room which
do not inhere in the verdict, e.g., reaching a verdict by a quotient. 42  Such
impropriety, however, where it is brought to the attention of the trial
judge who inquires properly into the matter and determines the issue
prior to discharge of the jury, may not be raised later bv affidavit. Where,
therefore, a judge suspected a verdict was a quotient verdict and explained
to the jurors the meaning of a quotient verdict, inquired into the manner
in which the verdict was reached, polled the jurors as to whether the
verdict was that of each individual juror and determined that the verdict
was not a quotient verdict, it was proper to refuse a subsequent affidavit
signed by a juror indicating that the verdict was a quotient verdict. 43
Verdict-Formal Defect
Formal defects in a verdict are waived if not objected to timely.
1lence, where a jury rendered a verdict in favor of two of three plaintiffs
in different sums and as to a third plaintiff found "for the plaintiff . . .
and against the defendant . .. , and assess her damages in the sum
of None Dollars . . . ;" and also found "for the defendant . . . in the
case of Carolyn R. Higbee [the third plaintiff] v. Werner Dorigo
[the defendant]," a clear intention to deny the third plaintiff any recovery
was manifested; such defect was merely formal and was waived by failure
to object earlier. 44
MOTIoN Fort Nmw TRIAL
Prejudice of Juror Withheld on Voir Dire
Where a prospective juror on his voir dire examination withholds
information which if disclosed would have indicated his animosity towards
a party and the party knew such information, the party does not have
grounds for a new trial. Where, however, such information pertains to
animosity against one of two alleged concurrent tortfeasors, the other
tortfeasor, if he lacked the information, is prejudiced. In such an action,
therefore, the court held that the juror's withholding of such information
was grounds for a new trial. 4" 5
Prejudicial Remarks by Judge
Where a judge in the course of a trial announces to the jury that
the parties are attempting to settle the case, such remarks, although
142. Jackson Grain Co. v. lHoskins, 75 So.ld 306 (Fla. 1954).
143. Marks v. State Road Dep't, 69 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1954). The court reasoned(p. 776) that to do otherwise "would result in unnecessarily harrassing jurors andhampering the effectual administration of justice. Moreover, we can imagine no better
time and place to decide the question with greatest accuracy than at a time when all
cvcuts are fresh in the minds of the jury and all interested parties are present." Does
not the case demonstrate the practical invalidity of the latter reason?
144. lligbee v. Dorigo, 66 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1953).
145. Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1953).
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ill-advised, are not sufficiently prejudicial to compel the trial judge to
declare a mistrial. 146
Newly Discovered Evidence
In Springer v. Morris"47 the court had occasion to repeat the six
restrictions on granting a new trial for newly discovered evidence. They
are worthy of reiteration:
(1) The evidence must have been discovered since the former
trial; (2) the party must have used due diligence to procure it on
the former trial; (3) it must be material to the issue; (4) it must
go to the merits of the cause, and not merely to impeach the
character of the witness; (5) It must not be merely cumulative;
(6) it must be such as ought to produce on another trial an
opposite result on the merits. 48
On Some Issues
Since 1951 the Circuit Court has had power to grant a new trial
on all or less than all of the issues in a case. Power to grant a new
trial on less than all issues may be exercised only where the issues in
the case are severable.' 42  In an action against a railroad company for
personal injuries the jury awarded excessive damages to the plaintiff.
The court said that ordering a new trial on the issue of damages alone
was proper; it was convinced that both the plaintiff and defendant were
negligent; the jury although it had been instructed on the doctrine of
comparative negligence either failed to apply the doctrine properly or
disregarded the evidence.' 50
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE
Reinstating Action Dismissed for Lack of Prosecution-"Good Cause"
Pending actions may be dismissed where they have not been prosecuted
for a year or more; within one month of dismissal application for reinstate-
ment may be made and allowed for "good cause shown to the court."'"
The mere fact that the parties were seeking to settle the case at the
time of dismissal is not good cause.' 52 Nor is the fact that to commence
an action anew will result in additional cost-at least where such cost
is not substantial. Ws
judgment by Default-Opening Default
A default judgment for failure to plead may be removed for good
cause if such removal is applied for within 60 days from entry of default
146. Martin v. Johns, 78 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1955).
147. 74 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla. 1954).
148. Howard v. State, 17 So. 84, 85 (Fla. 1895).
149. Brinson v. Howard, 71 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1954).
150. Martin v. Johns, 78 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1955).
151. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1953).
152. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Hill, 76 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1955).
153. Early v. Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage Dist., 67 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1953).
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or if a term of court intervenes, during the intervening term. '5 4 Hence,
where the defendant negligently failed to plead to the complaint and
applied more than 85 days after entry of default to have the default re-
moved, the trial court was without power to allow the application. Further,
the clerk's failure to enter default in the proper docket did not affect the
60-day period since 1) recordation of the default was unnecessary by
statute'-5 and 2) application was made 75 days after entry of final
judgment. 15 6
Reopening-Further Testimony
Reopening a case for the introduction of further testimony lies within
the sound discretion of the judge. Therefore, where such a motion
was made about seven weeks after trial and about five weeks after final
hearing and the findings and the decree had been announced but not
reduced to writing, the chancellor did not err in denying the motion.
Opportunity to introduce the "further testimony" at the trial had been
prescnt.' 5
Injunction-Bond
To secure a temporary injunction a plaintiff must post a bond of
indemnity or other security, unless he is unable to do so.' 8 Therefore,
where no such security was given and inability to post security was not
shown, it was held error to enter an injunction and continue it in force
after taking testimony on a motion to dissolve. 5 9 In another case a bond
was given and a temporary injunction was issued. Subsequently the order
was dissolved with leave to amend the bill. Thereupon the plaintiff
amended his bill and a new temporary restraining order was issued without
a further bond or security. The court held that the chancellor was in
error in issuing the injunction without new security, since the obligation
of the surety on the bond was confined to the original bill and could
not be enlarged by order of the court.'60
Injunction-Definiteness and Certainty
Injunctions should be definite and certain so that the persons at
whom they are directed caii know what is required of them. In Pizio v.
Babcock"' an injunction was held defective where it enjoined the de-
fendants "from . . . 10:00 p.m. until . . . 7:00 p.m." doing a number
of acts, one of which was "emptying garbage during the late hours of the
154. FLA. STAT, 50.10 (1953).
155. FLA. STAT, § 28.89 (1953).
156. State v. Ileffcrnan, 71 So.2d 745 (la. 1954).
157. Reading v. Blakeman, 66 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1953).
158. FLA. STAT,. §. 64.03 (1953). Lewis v. Lewis, 66 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1953).
159. International Brotherhood v. Miami Retail Groc., 76 So.2d 491 (Fla 1954).
160. hlall v. Hanford, 66 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1953).
161. 76 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1954).
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night and early hours of the morning .... " In addition to this inconsistency
the court considered "late hours" and "early hours" to be uncertain.
Iniunotion-Mandatory
Mandatory injunctions should not be issued prior to the final hearing
except "where the right is clear and free from reasonable doubt." So the
court said in Kline v. State Beverage Department of FloridaIG2 where the
chancellor refused a petition by a liquor licensee for a mandatory injunction
to require the Beverage Department to restore to him beverages it had
confiscated; he also sought to enjoin it from interfering with his liquor
license. The beverages had been seized when the licensee continued to
dispense intoxicants after the department had revoked his license on
grounds of illegal issuance. Although the Supreme Court in this case held
the department's action to be improper because the licensee had not been
given notice and an opportunity to be heard in the revocation proceedings,
the law on this point prior to this decision had not been "clear and free
from reasonable doubt." For this reason and also because the final
hearing had been set soon thereafter-23 days after the preliminary
hearing-the court held the refusals of temporary and mandatory injunc-
tions were not an abuse of discretion.
Modification of Decree-Notice-Procedural Due Process
In Attaway v. Attaway 0 upon the wife's application the circuit
court sentenced the defendant-husband to jail for failure to pay past due
alimony, giving him the opportunity to purge himself by payment. With-
out notice to the wife and without affording her an opportunity to be
heard the order was modified, and the husband was released upon his
promise to pay past due alimony, and in addition he was relieved from
his obligation to pay future alimony. Held: it was error to enter the
order without notice to the wife or affording her an opportunity to be
heard.
In Moore v. Lee,6 4 an action for custody of a child, a petition was
filed to modify the final decree which awarded custody to the defendant.
Notice of the proceeding was not given to the defendants and hence it
was error under such circumstances to have modified the decree.
GARNISHMENT
Equity Decree as Debt
Are garnishment proceedings available where a plaintiff has a final
decree in equity providing for the payment of money alone? By answering
in the affirmative the court put the doubts of many years at rest.'65
162. 77 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1955).
163. 80 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1955).
164. 72 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1954).
165. Gordman Corporation v. Bethel Construction Co., 77 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1955).
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Amending Bond
Although there is no specific statute permitting the amendment of a
garnishment bond (as in the case of an attachnent boud),'4"' nevertheless,
a garnishment bond may be amended on the basis of the statutory
provision generally permitting amendments. In Corbin v. St. Lucie River
Co."" the plaintiff filed an affidavit in garnishment accompanied by a
garnishment bond. When the defendant moved to dissolve and quash
the writ, presumably on the ground that the bond was not "in at least
double the debt or sum demanded,"'168 the plaintiff filed a new bond
sufficient in sum, but the trial court allowed the defendant's motion
nevertheless. This was held to be error.' 69
Abuse of Writ
After considering various provisions of Florida Statutes, Chapter 77,
relating to garnishment, the court concluded that the defendant's giving
a bond in discharge of a writ of garnishment does not constitute a waiver
of liability incurred from abusive employment of the writ.11 Worthy of
great consideration is the court's opinion that the law of garnishment is
"complex and confusing" owing to deficiencies in our garnishment statutes;
these statutes need "a thorough legislative overhauling." 1
CONTEMPT
Opportunity to be Heard
Rule 3.15 ("Enforcement of Final Decree"), formerly Equity Rule
67, provides that upon the plaintiff's filing an affidavit the clerk of court
shall issue a writ of attachment against a person who has allegedly violated
a decree ordering him to perform a specific act within a stated time. The
court has held that this rule can have no application to the violation of
support decrees providing for periodic payments. Amongst several objections
to its application, it would violate the defendant's constitutional right
to an opportunity to meet a charge prior to imprisonment. 72  In another
case counsel who failed to attend a pretrial conference, although notified
by the court to be present, was fined summarily by the trial judge without
being given an opportunity to be heard. The court, although emphasizing
the importance of the pretrial conference in expediting litigation and the
166. FLA. STAT. § 76.29 (1953).
167. 78 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1955).
168. FL. STAT. § 77.18 (1953).
169. It is respectfully submitted that the court was in error. The court cited
FLA. STAT. § 50.20 (1953) which refers to amending pleadings. This statute, however,
was repealed by Laws of Fla. c. 26962, § 1 (1951). The principal case was commenced in
1954. One must, however, agree with the court's result.
170. Nash v. Walker, 78 So.2d 685 (Fla. 1955).
171. All who have studied Florida's garnishment statutes must concur with the
court. Our statutes relating to attachment are likewise in need of repair.
172. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 80 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1955).
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need for cooperation of attorneys in that proceeding, concluded that the
case is not one warranting summary discipline. 173
Intention
Where a defendant unintentionally violates a restraining order, he
should not be found in contempt. In Florida Ventilated Awning Co. v.
Dickson,174 where the defendants were restrained from using a certain
trade name, the court reversed the contempt order of the chancellor
since the violation of the order was unintentional. Significant facts; the
order was complex and comprehensive; the violation was not of "great
importance"; the defendants were laymen of good repute; the violation
ceased when the defendants were apprised of it.
M 'maMs
Objection to Appointment
An extremely significant opinion relating indirectly to the expense of
litigation and the character of the chancery judicature is that in Slatcofj
v. Dezen' 75 wherein the question arose whether a chancellor, over the
objection of a party, is empowered to refer a case to a master with
instructions to hear witnesses, make findings of fact and report his findings
and his determinations as to the applicable law. After a scholarly historical
exposition on the authority of judges to appoint quasi-judicial assistants
to determine litigation and after a definitive review of the weight and
conclusiveness to be accorded to masters' findings, the court concluded
that the chancellor in the principal case lacked power to appoint a special
master. The court said that on the one hand a chancellor has authority
to appoint a special master to serve ministerially to perform a "particular
service"-even over the protestations of the parties-and on the other
hand he has no power to delegate to a special master authority to hear
and determine an entire case without the parties' consent. The present
case lay between these extremes.
Weight of Findings
In Frank v. Frank,7 6 a divorce suit, the weight to be accorded to a
master's findings was brought into focus. With the consent of the parties
a special master bad been appointed to make findings of fact, conclusions
of law and recommendations. Contrary to such findings the chancellor
denied a divorce decree, concluding that the plaintiff had not sustained
the burden of proving that she established a Florida domicile, a jurisdictional
fact. Applying the rule that a master's findings should be adopted unless
clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and reversed
the chancellor.
173. Lee v. Bauer. 72 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1954).
174. 67 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1953).
175. 74 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1954).
176. 75 So.ld 282 (Fla. 1954).
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Cosrs AND FEES
Costs-Unused Depositions
Taxable costs include the expense of reasonable and necessary experi-
ments, photographs and dcpositions. Ordinarily, however, they do not
embrace the cost of materials which neither are used nor serve a useful
purpose. illustrative of this rule is Loftin v. Anderson' 77 where the Supreme
Court reversed the trial court and cancelled as costs the expense of 78 pages
of an 81 page deposition, only three pages having been used at the trial.
More decisions of this sort would have a salutary effect on the cost of
litigation.
Costs-Against the State
Generally, in the absence of a statutory provision, the state and
its agencies are not liable for costs in actions to which they are parties.
At times this rule results in great hardship to the private litigant. Such
a case was State v. Colonial Acceptance""8 where the court held that costs,
including a receiver's fee, in an action brought by the Comptroller and
the Attorney General in their official capacities against a loan company
for an alleged violation of the Small Loan Company Act were not taxable
against the plaintiffs although the action had been dismissed in the
defendant's favor. The court intimated, however, that it might have held
otherwise if the plaintiff's investigation had been arbitrary and unreasonable.
In another case, a quo warranto proceeding, costs against the Attorney
General in his official capacity were allowed, the court construing a statute
to permit the allowance of such costs. The statute involved was Section
618.09, which requires the Attorney General to secure from a person
complaining that a corporation is used as a cover to evade a criminal
law sufficient money to cover court costs and expenses before bringing
proceedings to annul the corporation's franchise. The court concluded
the object of the statute was to reimburse a successful defendant of his
costs. 179
Fees-Master
In Miami v. HollisSO the court reduced a master's fee from $3,500 to$1,500 and sharply disapproved of paying advances on account of masters'
fees without a stipulation of the parties or without an order of the
chancellor.
177. 66 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1953).
178. 80 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1955).179. Miami Retreat Foundation v. Ervin, 66 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1953).
180. 77 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1955).
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Fees-Expert Witness
Pursuant to the 1949 statute which sets a maximum fee of $10 per
hour for expert witnesses,81 in a recent case the court directed the lower
court to reduce the fee for such testimony from $791 to $140.182
Fees-Attorneys
WvVhere a party sought to substitute counsel, the court, to protect
original counsel, invoked a well-established rule that requires two conditions
for such substitution: 1) paying original counsel's fee ofr posting sufficient
security in lieu thereof, and 2) procuring the court's consent. 83
181 FLA. STAT. § 90.231(2) (1953).
182. H. 1. Granger & Sons v. Clay County Farms, 77 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1955).
183. D'Agostino v. Peoples Water and Gas Company, 78 So.ld 739 (Fla. 1955).
